Induction by enumeration has a clear interpretation within the numerical paradigm of inductive discovery (i.e., the one pioneered by [Gold, 1967]). The concept is less easily interpreted within the first-order paradigm discussed by [Kelly, 1996 , Martin & Osherson, 1998 ], in which the scientist's data amount to the basic diagram of a structure. We formulate two kinds of enumerative induction that are appropriate to the first-order paradigm, and analyze their potential for discovery. Among other results, it is shown that one form of enumerative induction achieves maximum inductive competence.
Introduction
Enumerative induction may be illustrated by the following game pitting you against Nature. Let N be the natural numbers, {0, 1, · · ·}. Nature chooses a set S from the collection A = {N − {x} | x ∈ N }. She then presents you with an arbitrary enumeration of S. Upon examining each newly presented number, you issue a member of A with the goal of stabilizing to S. One way to proceed is to make your own enumeration of A. Then at each stage you conjecture the first member of your enumeration that includes the finite set of numbers encountered so far. (Thus, if your enumeration puts N − {i} in the ith position, your conjecture after seeing 5, 1, 0 would be N − {2}.) Such is "induction by enumeration" or "enumerative induction," and it is easy to see that in this case it works: no matter which member S of A is chosen by Nature, and no matter the order in which its numbers are presented to you, your conjectures will be right cofinitely often, that is, you will stabilize to S. Moreover, you will succeed in this way no matter how you enumerate A.
The foregoing strategy appears to be the lowest form of inductive life with a semblance of intelligence. So one is curious to determine its scope and limits. There are problems like those above -in which the hypotheses form a countable collection of subsets of N -that can be solved but not by enumerative induction. On the other hand, if the hypotheses form a countable collection of total functions from N to N then enumerative induction always works. These facts are verified straightforwardly. 1 The theory of enumerative induction is more challenging when projected into a recursion theoretic setting, in which inductive strategies must be implementable via computer. Aspects of the resulting theory are presented in [Jain et al., 1999] .
The inductive problems evoked so far have a numerical cast since Nature's choice ranges over subsets of N or over functions from N to N . In contrast, the goal of the present work is to explore enumerative induction within the "first-order" paradigm discussed in [Kelly, 1996 , Martin & Osherson, 1998 ] and elsewhere. The latter paradigm conceives Nature as choosing among disjoint collections of relational structures and can be shown to include the numerical framework as a special case (see [Martin & Osherson, 1998, Secs. 3.1.5, 3.5.6] ). We here leave computational issues to one side, in order to focus on the pure logic of enumerative induction.
In what follows we first review the concepts needed to define the first-order paradigm of scientific (or "inductive") inquiry. Next we specify two kinds of inductive strategies, each of enumerative character. The powers of the two strategies are then analyzed and compared. Among other things we show that one of them is a canonical form for inductive inference: any solvable problem can be solved via the method.
Preliminaries
All the material in the present section is drawn from [Martin & Osherson, 1998, Secs. 3.1, 3.2] . The paradigm we define is similar to other classification tasks involving learning, e.g., those discussed in [Smith et al., 1997 , Gasarch et al., 1998 ]. In each case, the learner must determine the category from which an underlying reality is drawn, and need not necessarily determine the specific identity of that reality.
Language and structures
To get started we fix a countable set Sym consisting of predicates and function symbols of various arities, along with constants. The (denumerable) set {v i | i ∈ N } of variables in Sym is denoted by Var. The resulting set of first-order formulas is denoted: L form . The set of basic formulas (atomic formulas along with their negations) is denoted: L basic . Both Sym and Var should be conceived as fixed throughout our discussion. However, the theorems below sometimes require special hypotheses on Sym (typically, that it include predicates of various arities). When stated without such hypotheses, our results are true for any choice of (countable) Sym.
To interpret our language we rely on countable structures with signature appropriate to Sym. The countability assumption is not essential to our paradigm, but simplifies the discussion. (For extension to structures of arbitrary countability, see [Martin & Osherson, 1998, Sec. 3.7] .) Once again: structures are henceforth assumed to have countable domains (either finite or infinite).
The domain of structure S is denoted by | S |.
Let Γ ⊆ L form be given. We say that structure S is a model of Γ just in case there is an assignment h : Var → | S | with S |= Γ[h]; in this case S satisfies Γ. The class of all structures that satisfy Γ is denoted by MOD(Γ).
The first-order paradigm
Before giving formal definitions, let us provide an overview of the paradigm. It is conceived as a game between Nature and a scientist. The same partition of a given collection of structures is communicated to both players. Each cell is considered to be a "proposition," that is, a collection of possible worlds (structures). Nature chooses a structure S from one of the propositions of the partition. She also chooses an assignment h : Var → | S | onto | S | (that h be onto is crucial). Then she fixes an arbitrary enumeration of {β ∈ L basic | S |= β[h]}, the set of all basic formulas made true in S by h. The scientist is fed this enumeration one formula at a time. After each input, she conjectures a proposition of her choice. The scientist wins the game if cofinitely many of her conjectures are accurate. She "solves" the problem posed by the game if she is guaranteed to win regardless of Nature's choices.
Discussion of the paradigm along with variants is available in [Martin & Osherson, 1998, Ch. 3] . Now for the formalities.
Propositions and problems
(1) Definition: A nonempty class of structures is a proposition. A problem is a collection of disjoint propositions.
(2) Example: Suppose that Sym consists of a binary predicate R. Let T be the theory of total orders (with respect to R) with either a least point or a greatest point (but not both). Let θ = ∃x∀yRxy ("there is a least point") and P = {MOD(T ∪ {θ}), MOD(T ∪ {¬θ})}. Then P is a problem consisting of the propositions MOD(T ∪ {θ}) and MOD(T ∪ {¬θ}).
In this example P is composed of propositions that are elementary classes, that is, specified by sets of sentences. Propositions are arbitrary collections of structures, however, and problems need not have elementary members.
Environments
(3) Definition: Let structure S be given. A full assignment to S is any mapping of Var onto | S |.
A full assignment h to S may be conceived as providing temporary names for all the elements of | S |. These names are exploited for the purpose of presenting the "basic diagram" of S to the scientist. The presentation is called an "environment," defined as follows.
(4) Definition: Let structure S and full assignment h to S be given.
(a) An environment for S and h is a sequence e such that range
(b) An environment for S is an environment for S and h, for some full assignment h to S.
(c) An environment is an environment for some structure.
(d) An environment for proposition P is an environment for some S ∈ P .
(e) An environment for problem P is an environment for some P ∈ P.
(5) Example: Let binary predicate R be the only member of Sym, and suppose that structure S with
then one environment for S and g begins this way:
If P is the proposition containing every strict total order, then this same environment is for P . If P is a problem that includes P as a component proposition, then the environment is also for P. The following lemma provides a sense in which environments offer complete information about the structures they are for. The proof is easy (and also an immediate consequence of [Keisler, 1977, Prop 3.2(i) ]).
(7) Lemma: Let structures S and T be given.
(a) If S and T are isomorphic then the set of environments for S is identical to the set of environments for T .
(b) If some environment is for both S and T then S and T are isomorphic.
Data
(8) Definition: Let SEQ denote the collection of proper initial segments of any environment. The set of elements appearing in σ ∈ SEQ is denoted by range(σ).
Thus, SEQ is the countable set of all consistent finite sequences of basic formulas. It exhausts the potential data that can become available to scientists. Given σ ∈ SEQ, we denote by σ the conjunction (in order of appearance in σ) of the formulas in range(σ). If σ = ∅, then σ is taken to be ∀v 0 (v 0 = v 0 ).
(9) Definition: Let σ ∈ SEQ be given. We say that σ is for proposition P just in case σ is satisfiable in some member of P . We say that σ is for problem P just in case σ is for some P ∈ P.
Thus, σ is for a problem P just in case there is S ∈ P that satisfies σ.
Scientists A scientist is represented by any partial or total mapping of SEQ into subclasses of structures. That is, if scientist Ψ is defined on σ ∈ SEQ, then Ψ(σ) is a collection of structures, thus a proposition. 2
Success The definition that follows requires scientists to reach stable belief in the one true proposition of P, namely, the proposition that includes the structure presented to the scientist.
(10) Definition: Let scientist Ψ be given.
(a) Let environment e for proposition P be given. We say that Ψ solves P in e just in case for cofinitely many k, Ψ(e[k]) = P . We say that Ψ solves P just in case Ψ solves P in every environment for P .
(b) Let problem P be given. We say that Ψ solves P just in case Ψ solves every member of P. In this case we say that P is solvable, and otherwise unsolvable.
Unraveling the definitions, we see that solving P requires solving every P ∈ P in every environment for P . Equivalently: Ψ solves P just in case for every P ∈ P, every S ∈ P, and every environment e for S, there are cofinitely many k such that Ψ(e[k]) = P .
For example, the problem P specified in Example (2) is solvable, as will be seen in Example (17) below. In contrast, it can be shown that the problem whose cosets are all structures of given (countable) cardinality is not solvable. For the latter fact, and many other examples of solvable and unsolvable problems, see [Martin & Osherson, 1998 ].
Tip-offs and solvability
We now state a necessary and sufficient condition for solvability that will be central to our analysis of enumerative induction. The condition requires the following definition.
(11) Definition: By a π-set is meant any collection of ∀ formulas all of whose free variables are drawn from the same finite set. Let problem P and P ∈ P be given. A tip-off for P in P is a countable collection t of π-sets such that:
(a) for every S ∈ P and full assignment h to S, there is π ∈ t with S |= π[h];
(b) for all U and P with P ∈ P, U ∈ P , and P = P , all full assignments g to U, and
If every member of P has a tip-off in P, then we say that P has tip-offs.
The following theorem is proved in [Martin & Osherson, 1998, Sec. 3.2] .
(12) Theorem: A problem is solvable if and only if it is countable and has tip-offs.
Two kinds of induction by enumeration
To implement enumerative induction in the first-order paradigm, the first idea might be as follows. Given a countable problem P, fix an enumeration E of the propositions in P. Then for any σ ∈ SEQ for P, conjecture the E-first proposition that is consistent with σ. It is clear, however, that this strategy fails to solve P of Example (2) since both members of P are consistent with every σ for P.
Discrete enumerative induction
Given a problem P, a more promising method works as follows. First, a set of formulas is enumerated. Then for any σ ∈ SEQ, the first formula ψ is sought such that MOD( σ ∧ ψ) ∩ P is a nonempty subset of some P ∈ P. This P is conjectured. Intuitively, the scientist proceeds down the ordering of formulas, looking for the first one that (in conjunction with the data σ) picks out an admissible conjecture i.e., a member of P. Generalizing this idea slightly leads to the following definition.
(13) Definition: Let problem P be given, and let O be a well ordering of a set of formulas.
We define the scientist ∆[P, O] as follows. Let σ ∈ SEQ be given.
Case 1: There exists a first ψ ∈ O such that:
(*) for some P ∈ P, ∅ = {S ∈ P | σ ∧ ψ is satisfiable in S} ⊆ P .
Then this P is unique (since the members of P are disjoint), and ∆[P, O] = P .
Case 2: There is no ψ ∈ O that satisfies (*). Then ∆[P, O] is undefined.
Let X ⊆ L form be given. We define the discrete X-type of P as follows. If for every well-ordering O of a subset of X, the scientist ∆[P, O] does not solve P, then the discrete X-type of P is undefined. Otherwise, the discrete X-type of P is the first ordinal α such that for some well-ordering O of a subset of X, (a) the well order type of O is α, and
The definition holds the promise of a bidimensional classification of solvable problems. Given a problem's discrete X-type, one dimension records the quantifier complexity figuring in the formulas of X. The other records the lowest ordinal (if there is one) needed to arrange X successfully. It will turn out, however, that both dimensions collapse considerably, and that not every solvable problem can be sucessfully approached by discrete enumerative induction [see Proposition (60) , below].
Segmental enumerative induction
To define a more successful kind of enumerative induction we must allow the scientist to pick out propositions via infinite sets of formulas (the discrete version offers just one formula at a time). For this purpose we rely on the following notation.
(14) Definition: Let O be a well ordering of a set of formulas. Let σ ∈ SEQ and initial segment s of O be given. We denote by satform(s, σ) the set of satisfiable formulas of the form σ ∧ ψ, where ψ ∈ s.
Thus, satform(s, σ) gathers together all the formulas in the segment s of O that are consistent with σ. Such sets are useful because of the following (easy) fact.
(15) Lemma: Let problem P be given, and let O be a well ordering of a set of formulas. Let σ ∈ SEQ also be given. Then there is at most one P ∈ P such that for some initial segment
So, given a problem P and an ordering O of formulas, the scientist can search in O for the first initial segment s such that satform(s, σ) picks out a proposition in P. This is the idea behind the following definition.
(16) Definition: Let problem P be given, and let O be a well ordering of a set of formulas.
We define the scientist Ψ[P, O] as follows. Let σ ∈ SEQ be given.
Case 1:
There exists an initial segment s of O such that:
Then by Lemma (15) this P is unique and we set Ψ[P, O] = P .
Case 2: There is no initial segment s of O that satisfies (**).
Let X ⊆ L form be given. We define the segmental X-type of P as follows. If for every wellordering O of a subset of X, the scientist Ψ[P, O] does not solve P, then the segmental X-type of P is undefined. Otherwise, the segmental X-type of P is the first ordinal α such that for some well-ordering O of a subset of X, (a) the well order type of O is α, and
It is not immediately evident how to compare the inductive powers of discrete versus segmental methods. Given an ordering O, initial segment s of O, and σ ∈ SEQ, satform(s, σ) may be inconsistent, and thus be useless for picking out propositions. Perhaps there are solvable problems for which this difficulty arises inevitably. But in fact such is not the case; we will see that every solvable problem can be solved via segmental enumerative induction.
For notational simplicity, we denote the class of universal formulas by ∀, and similarly for other quantifier prefixes. Observe that both the discrete and segmental types of unsolvable problems are undefined (and if either is defined, the problem is solvable). We will see later that the discrete type of some solvable problems is also undefined.
(17) Example: Let P be as in Example (2). Given n ∈ N , set ψ 2n = ∀yRv n y and
, full assignment h to S, and environment e for S and h be given (the proof is parallel if
Hence, both the discrete and segmental ∀-types of P are bounded by ω.
We can exploit the example to make a useful point about types. The formulas that fix a type might require free variables; there may be no comparable ordering of sentences (closed formulas) that allows enumerative induction to proceed. The pitfall for sentences is that free variables may be needed to refer to specific objects denoted by variables in an environment. This is illustrated in extreme form for the discrete case by the next proposition. It shows that restriction to sentences can foreclose enumerative induction for a problem where it might have been successfully applied.
(18) Proposition: Suppose that Sym consists of a binary predicate. Then there is a problem P such that:
(a) the discrete ∀-type of P is defined (hence P is solvable);
(b) the discrete L sen -type of P is undefined.
Proof: Let R be the binary predicate of Sym. Let T be the theory of total orders (with respect to R) with either a least point or a greatest point (but not both). Let θ = ∃x∀yRxy. We show that P = {MOD(T ∪ {θ}), MOD(T ∪ {¬θ})}, satisfies the claim of the proposition. Clause (a) has been proved in Example (17). We prove (b). Let O be any well ordering of some set X of sentences. If no sentence in X is true in any member of P, then ∆[P, O] = ∅ and we are done. Otherwise, let sentence ψ be the O-least member of X which is true in some S ∈ P.
Suppose that S ∈ MOD(T ∪ {θ}) (the proof is parallel if S ∈ MOD(T ∪ {¬θ})).
Let σ ∈ SEQ be for P. Because all the models of T are infinite, σ is satisfiable in S, hence σ ∧ ψ is satisfiable in S (since ψ is closed). This shows that for all σ ∈ SEQ which are for P,
Tip-off bases
To launch our investigation of discrete and segmental enumerative induction, a technical tool is needed. It can be deployed when a problem enjoys tip-offs of a particularly simple character.
(19) Definition: Let set X of ∀ formulas and problem P be given. We say that X is a tip-off base for P just in case:
(a) for every S ∈ P and full assignment h to S, there is ϕ ∈ X such that S |= ϕ[h];
(b) for all ϕ ∈ X, there is at most one P ∈ P such that ϕ is satisfiable in some member of P .
There are two natural classes of problems that often arise in the first-order paradigm. When solvable they turn out to be distinguishable in terms of tip-off bases. The classes are defined as follows.
(20) Definition:
(a) Let problem P, T ⊆ L sen , and θ 0 . . . θ n ∈ L sen be given. We say that P has the form (T , {θ 0 . . . θ n }) just in case:
i. for every model S of T there is exactly one i ∈ {0 . . . n} such that S |= θ i ; ii.
Problems of both forms are discussed extensively in [Martin & Osherson, 1998 ]. For present purposes the relevant facts are given in the next two lemmas.
(21) Lemma: Every solvable problem of form (T , {θ 0 . . . θ n }) has a tip-off base.
Proof: Let a solvable problem of form (T , {θ 0 . . . θ n }) be given. By [Martin & Osherson, 1998, Theorem (55) , p. 81], for all m ≤ n, θ m is equivalent in T to an ∃∀ sentence. It follows easily that the problem has a tip-off base. Proof: Let T ⊆ L sen and disjoint propositions
Suppose for a contradiction that set X = {ϕ i | i ∈ N } of ∀ formulas is a tip-off base for P = {P 0 , P 1 . . .}. For all i ∈ N , let ψ i be the conjunction of the universal closure of ¬ϕ 0 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬ϕ i−1 with the existential closure of ϕ i . Trivially:
Let P ∈ P and S ∈ P be given. By Definition (19)a, there is least i ∈ N such that ϕ i is satisfiable in S. Hence ψ i is true in S ∈ P . By Definition (19)b, ϕ i is satisfiable in no P ∈ P with P = P . Hence ψ i is false in all members of P ∈ P, P = P . Since P is infinite, this proves that:
Moreover, since P = MOD(T ), the preceding facts imply:
From (23) and (24), we infer that T ∪{¬ψ 0 . . . ¬ψ i } is satisfiable for all i ∈ N . With compactness, this implies that T ∪ {¬ψ i | i ∈ N } is satisfiable, which contradicts (25).
Now we can begin to harness the concept of tip-off base. The next proposition shows that every problem with a tip-off base lends itself easily to enumerative induction of the discrete kind.
(26) Proposition: Let set X of ∀ formulas be a tip-off base for problem P. Then for every enumeration E of ∀ formulas with X ⊆ range(E), the scientist ∆[P, E] solves P.
Proof: Let X be a tip-off base for P, and let E = {ϕ i | i ∈ N } be an enumeration of ∀ formulas with X ⊆ range(E). Let P ∈ P, S ∈ P , full assignment h to S, and environment e for S and h be given. We will show that ∆[P, E] solves P in e, thus proving that ∆[P, E] solves P.
By Definition (19), there is least i 0 ∈ N such that:
|= ¬ϕ i then ϕ i is satisfiable in at least two structures taken from two distinct propositions in P;
) ∪ {ϕ i 0 } is satisfiable in S ∈ P , and ϕ i 0 is satisfiable in no member of P , for all P ∈ P, P = P .
This implies immediately that for all
From Lemma (21) and Proposition (26) it is easy to derive the following.
(27) Corollary: Let solvable problem P of form (T , {θ 0 . . . θ n }) be given. Then for every enumeration E of all ∀ formulas, the scientist ∆[P, E] solves P.
The corollary reveals that discrete enumerative induction is strikingly easy for problems of the form (T , {θ 0 . . . θ n }). There is no need for an astute choice of formulas nor for a clever way to order them. Any ω-ordering of the universal formulas does the trick.
Proposition (26) informs us that the existence of a tip-off base is a sufficient condition for the solvability of a problem via discrete enumerative induction. But it is not necessary. As shown by the next proposition (whose proof is deferred to Section 6), there are problems without a tip-off base that can nevertheless be solved via enumerative induction of the discrete kind.
(28) Proposition: Suppose that Sym consists of a unary function symbol and a constant.
Then there is a solvable problem P with the following properties.
(a) P has no tip-off base.
(b) The discrete ∀-type of P is defined.
The problem to be exhibited in the proof of Proposition (28) has infinite discrete ∀-type. The next proposition shows this to be no accident.
(29) Proposition: Every problem with finite discrete ∀-type has a tip-off base.
Proof: Let problem P with finite discrete ∀-type be given. Let finite enumeration E of ∀ formulas be such that ∆[P, E] solves P. Define X to be the set of all formulas of form σ ∧ ϕ, σ ∈ SEQ, ϕ ∈ E, satisfying the following:
(30) there is at most one P ∈ P such that σ ∧ ϕ is satisfiable in some member of P .
It suffices to show that X is a tip-off base for P. By (30) this is proved if we show that for all S ∈ P and full assignments h to S, there is ψ ∈ X with S |= ψ [h] . So let P ∈ P, S ∈ P , and full assignment h to S be given. Since ∆[P, E] solves P, there is k 0 ∈ N and ϕ ∈ E such that:
We derive immediately from (31) 
Finite types
Discrete enumerative induction has an elementary character if it involves ordering no more than a finite number of universal formulas. We expect problems solvable by such a method to be simple in some combinatorial sense. Proposition (29) satisfies this expectation; problems with finite discrete ∀-type enjoy tip-off bases in the sense of Definition (19). Does the same kind of simplicity characterize problems solvable by segmental enumerative induction over a finite ordering of universal formulas? The answer is affirmative because the same class of problems is at issue. Indeed, the next proposition shows that for every n ∈ N , the discrete ∀-type of a problem is n if and only if the segmental ∀-type of the problem is also n. (We subsequently show that all of these types are populated.) (32) Proposition: For all problems P, the discrete ∀-type of P is finite iff the segmental ∀-type of P is finite. Moreover, if finite, they are equal.
Proof: Let problem P be given. The discrete ∀-type of P is equal to 0 iff the segmental ∀-type of P is equal to 0 iff P = ∅. So suppose P = ∅. If P consists of a sole proposition, and if this proposition is the class of all structures, then it is easy to verify that the discrete and segmental ∀-types of P are both equal to 1. So suppose otherwise. It suffices to show that if the discrete ∀-type of P is equal to p > 0, then the segmental ∀-type of P is at most equal to p, and if the segmental ∀-type of P is equal to p > 0, then the discrete ∀-type of P is at most equal to p. Let n ∈ N and enumeration E = {ϕ i | i ≤ n} of ∀ formulas be such that ∆[P, E] solves P. We show that Ψ[P, E] solves P, thus proving that if the discrete ∀-type of P is finite, then the segmental ∀-type of P is at most equal to the latter. Let P ∈ P, S ∈ P , full assignment h to S, and environment e for S and h be given. It suffices to show that Ψ[P, E] solves P in e. Since ∆[P, E] solves P (and E is finite), there is k 0 ∈ N and n 0 ≤ n such that:
In particular, (33) implies that e[k] ∧ ϕ n 0 is satisfiable for all k ∈ N . Hence by compactness, range(e) ∪ {ϕ n 0 } is satisfiable. Since ϕ n 0 is a ∀ formula and e is an environment for S and h, we
We have thus shown that ϕ n 0 ∈ X. With (33), this implies that:
Conversely, let n ∈ N and enumeration E = {ϕ i | i ≤ n} of ∀ formulas be such that Ψ[P, E] solves P. For all i ≤ n, denote by ψ i the disjunction of all the conjunctions of subsets of {ϕ 0 . . . ϕ n } whose cardinality is equal to n + 1 − i (conjunctions are written in ascending order of indexes of the ϕ i 's). For instance:
Note that all of the ψ i 's are ∀ formulas. Set F = {ψ i | i ≤ n}. We show that ∆[P, F ] solves P, thus proving that if the segmental ∀-type of P is finite, then the discrete ∀-type of P is at most equal to the latter. Let P ∈ P, S ∈ P , full assignment h to S, and environment e for S and h be given. It suffices to show that ∆[P, F ] solves P in e. Since Ψ[P, E] solves P (and E is finite), there is k 0 ∈ N and X ⊆ {ϕ 0 . . . ϕ n } such that:
Since by hypothesis P does not consist of a sole proposition equal to the class of all structures, it is clear from Definition (16) that:
Moreover, (35) implies that range (e[k] ) ∪ X is consistent for all k ∈ N . Hence by compactness, range(e) ∪ X is satisfiable. Since X is a set of ∀ formulas and e is an environment for S and h,
. We have thus shown that: 
From (35), (37) and (39), we infer that
For every n ∈ N , the problems with discrete ∀-type equal to n are the same as those with segmental ∀-type equal to n. This is the content of the preceding proposition. The proposition would not be informative if there were no such problems. But the finite types are in fact rich, as the next proposition reveals.
(40) Proposition: Suppose that Sym = ∅. For all n ∈ N there is a problem whose discrete and segmental ∀-types are n.
Proof: The empty problem satisfies the claim of the proposition for n = 0. Given n > 0, denote by ϕ n the sentence ∀x 0 . . . x n ( 0≤i<j≤n x i = x j ) ("there are at most n elements"). For all n > 0, let P n be the class of structures whose cardinality is n. Let n > 0 be given. By Proposition (32) it suffices to show that the problem P = {P 1 . . . P n } has discrete ∀-type equal to n. Set E = {ϕ 1 . . . ϕ n }. We first show that ∆[P, E] solves P, thus proving that the discrete ∀-type of P is at most equal to n. Let 1 ≤ m ≤ n and environment e for P m be given. It suffices to show that ∆[P, E] solves P m in e. Let k 0 ∈ N be such that e[k 0 ] implies that there are at least m distinct elements in the domain of the underlying structure. Trivially, for all k
We now show that the discrete ∀-type of P is at least equal to n, thus completing the proof. Let m > 0 and enumeration F = {ψ 1 . . . ψ m } of ∀ formulas be such that ∆[P, F ] solves P. It suffices to show that n ≤ m. Suppose that sequence {σ p | 1 ≤ p ≤ n} of members of SEQ and function f : {1 . . . n} → {1 . . . m} satisfy:
Since the P p 's are pairwise disjoint, it is easy to see that f is one-to-one, which implies that n ≤ m. So we only have to build a sequence {σ p | 1 ≤ p ≤ n} of members of SEQ and a function f : {1 . . . n} → {1 . . . m} that satisfy (41). We proceed by induction on p. For p = 1 let e 1 be an environment for P 1 . Since ∆[P, F ] solves P there is k ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ m such that ∅ = {S ∈ P | e 1 [k] ∧ ψ i is satisfiable in S} ⊆ P 1 . Set σ 1 = e 1 [k] and f (1) = i. Observe that σ 1 is an initial segment of an environment for P 1 . For the induction step p > 1 suppose that σ 1 . . . σ p−1 and f (1) . . . f (p − 1) have been defined and that σ p−1 is an initial segment of an environment for P p−1 . Let environment e for P p be given, extending σ p−1 ; there is such an environment since the cardinality of structures in P p is greater than that for structures in P p−1 . Since ∆[P, F ] solves P, there is k > length(σ p−1 ) and
and f (p) = i. We see that {σ p | 1 ≤ p ≤ n} and f satisfy (41). (32) and (40) depend on the intimate connection between universal formulas and environments for a structure; any such formula false in the structure is inconsistent with each of its environments. [This is because the assignments underlying environments are required to be onto; see Definition (4).] One might hope that enumerative induction based only on finitely many formulas reduces to the case where all the formulas involved are ∀. But matters are not so simple. Indeed, it will be seen below that there are problems whose discrete and segmental ∀∃ and ∃∀-types are 2 although their ∀-types are not finite. Can anything general be said about finite types in this broader context? We can report only the following fact about the coincidence of finite types across the discrete/segmental divide. Here the quantifiers of enumerated formulas are not constrained at all.
The proofs of Propositions
(42) Proposition: For all problems P, if the segmental L form -type of P is finite then the discrete L form -type of P is finite.
Proof: Let problem P have finite segmental L form -type. Let enumeration E = {ϕ 0 . . . ϕ n } of formulas be such that Ψ[P, E] solves P. Without loss of generality we can suppose that
, which comes before ϕ 2 .) It suffices to show that ∆[P, F ] solves P. Let P ∈ P, S ∈ P , full assignment h to S, and environment e for S and h be given. It suffices to show that ∆[P, F ] solves P in e. Since Ψ[P, E] solves P [and E is finite and begins with (x = x)], there is m ≤ n and nonempty X ⊆ {ϕ 0 . . . ϕ m } such that the following holds for cofinitely many k:
Let ψ ∈ F be the conjunction of all members of X (written in ascending order of indexes of the ϕ i 's). Let χ ∈ F come before ψ in F . By the definition of F there are two cases: Case 2: For all p ≤ n, if ϕ p occurs in χ then ϕ p occurs in ψ. Since all members of P are pairwise disjoint, it then follows from (43)a,b that for cofinitely many k, {T ∈ P | e[k] ∧ χ is satisfiable in T } ⊆ P for all P ∈ P.
By (43)a and the definition of ψ, ∅ = {T ∈ P | e[k] ∧ ψ is satisfiable in T } ⊆ P for cofinitely many k. We conclude from the preceding facts that ∆[P, F ](e[k]) = P for cofinitely many k. Hence ∆[P, F ] solves P in e, as required.
Infinite types
The results of the previous section show that the discrete and segmental ∀-types coincide in the finite case. Does this situation extend to the infinite, and if so, for which ordinals? We'll derive the following answer: when both are defined, the two kinds of ∀-types coincide, and they are never greater than ω. The following proposition covers much of the distance to this result, and provides other useful information.
(44) Proposition: For every solvable problem P, there exists a set X of ∀ formulas such that for every enumeration E of X, the scientist Ψ[P, E] solves P.
Proof: Let solvable problem P = {P j | j ∈ N } be given. For all j ∈ N let t j be a tip-off for P j in P. By the countability of tip-offs, let the π-sets in j∈N t j be enumerated as
Denote by E any enumeration of X. Since X consists of ∀ formulas, to prove the proposition it suffices to show that Ψ[P, E] solves P. Let j ∈ N , S ∈ P j , full assignment h to S, and environment e for S and h be given. It suffices to show that
Since for all i < i 0 , ϕ
is a ∀ formula, and since h is onto | S |, it follows from (45)b that there is k 0 > 0 such that:
We deduce from (46) that:
(47) for all k ≥ k 0 and for all ϕ ∈ Y , e[k] ∧ ϕ is unsatisfiable.
From (45)a and the fact that S |=
For k ∈ N , let E(e [k] ) be the set of satisfiable formulas of the form e[k] ∧ ψ, ψ ∈ E [as in Definition (14)]. It follows immediately from (47), (48) and (49) that:
We infer from (50) that for all k ≥ k 0 , there is an initial segment s of E such that ∅ = {T ∈ P | satform (s, e[k] ) is satisfiable in T } ⊆ P j . It follows immediately from Definition (16) that
We see from the proposition that segmental enumerative induction using ∀ formulas is a universal strategy of inference: every solvable problem can be solved this way. Moreover, designing a successful agent of this kind requires no more than specifying the right set X of ∀ formulas. No further insight is required for their ordering since any enumeration will do the job.
A similar order-independence characterizes discrete enumerative induction using ∀ formulas; and the ordinal is again bounded by ω. But it is necessary to qualify this fact by the proviso that the discrete ∀-type be defined for the problem in question; for, we will soon see solvable problems with undefined discrete types at every level of quantifier complexity. The discrete parallel to the preceding proposition can thus be stated as follows.
(51) Proposition: Let solvable problem P have defined discrete ∀-type. Then there exists a set X of ∀ formulas such that for every enumeration E of X, ∆[P, E] solves P.
The proposition follows directly from the proof of the following lemma, of interest in its own right.
(52) Lemma: For all solvable problems P, the discrete ∀-type of P is defined if and only if the following condition holds:
(*) For all P ∈ P, and all σ ∈ SEQ for P , there is a ∀ formula ϕ such that ∅ = {S ∈ P | σ ∧ ϕ is satisfiable in S} ⊆ P .
Proof: Let solvable problem P be given. For the "only if" direction, suppose that (*) does not hold. Let P ∈ P and σ ∈ SEQ for P be such that for all ∀ formulas ϕ, either {S ∈ P | σ ∧ ϕ is satisfiable in S} = ∅ or {S ∈ P | σ ∧ ϕ is satisfiable in S} ⊆ P . Then for all τ ∈ SEQ extending σ:
Let environment e for P with σ ⊆ e be given. Then (53) For the "if" direction, suppose that (*) holds. Suppose that P = ∅ (otherwise the discrete ∀-type of P is trivially equal to 0). We will define a set X of ∀ formulas and show that for every enumeration E of X, ∆[P, E] solves P. First we define X. Let κ ≤ ω and propositions P j , j < κ, be such that P = {P j | j < κ} and for all j < j < κ, P j and P j are distinct. Since P is solvable, for all j < κ let t j be a tip-off for P j in P. By the countability of tip-offs, let the π-sets in j<κ t j be enumerated as {π i | i ∈ N }. Without loss of generality we can assume that for all i ∈ N , π i is satisfiable in some member of P.
Let i ∈ N be given. Fix an enumeration {ϕ n i | n ∈ N } of π i and an enumeration {α n i | n ∈ N } of all α ∈ L basic such that π i |= α. By the definition of tip-offs, and since P j and P j are distinct for all j < j < κ, there is a unique j < κ such that π i is satisfiable in some member of P j . Fix an enumeration {σ n i | n ∈ N } of all σ ∈ SEQ such that π i ∪ range(σ) is satisfiable in some member of P j . Let n ∈ N be given. We define a formula ψ n i as follows. It is easy to verify that there is σ ∈ SEQ such that range(σ) = {α 0 i . . . α n i } ∪ range(σ n i ) and σ is satisfiable in some member of P j . Hence, σ is for P j . By (*) there exists a ∀ formula ϕ such that
We choose one such ∀ formula ϕ and denote it by ψ n i . Given i, j, n 0 . . . n i ∈ N , define the formula of form (i, n 0 . . . n i ) to be:
Let X be the set of formulas of form (i, n 0 . . . n i ), i, n 0 . . . n i ∈ N . Note that X consists of ∀ formulas. Let E be any enumeration of X. We show that ∆[P, E] solves P. Let j < κ, S ∈ P j , full assignment h to S, and environment e for S and h be given. It suffices to show that ∆[P, E] solves P j in e. Let i 0 ∈ N be least such that S |= π 
and the ψ n i are ∀ formula, and since h is onto | S |, it follows from (55)b,c and the definition of the ψ n i that there is k 0 > 0 such that the following holds.
(56) (a) For all k ≥ k 0 and for all
is unsatisfiable.
(c) Let i < i 0 and (unique) P ∈ P be such that π i is satisfiable in some member of P . By (57), for all ϕ ∈ X, if there is P ∈ P with ∅ = {T ∈ P | e[k] ∧ ϕ is satisfiable in T } ⊆ P then P = P j . So to finish the proof it suffices to exhibit ϕ ∈ X such that:
. We infer immediately from (56)a and the definition of ψ n i 0
) satisfies (58), as required.
The lemma also allows us to derive Proposition (28), whose proof was deferred. (28): Let s be the function symbol and 0 the constant of Sym. For n ∈ N , let n be the result of n applications of s to 0. Set:
Proof of Proposition
For all n > 0, set:
We claim that P = {P 0 , P 1 . . .} witnesses the proposition.
Clearly, for all i ∈ N , P i = ∅ and for all distinct i, j ∈ N , P i ∩ P j = ∅, hence P = {P 0 , P 1 . . .} is an infinite problem. It is equally immediate that P is solvable, and that P is the class of all structures. So (a) follows directly from Lemma (22).
It remains to show (b). Let P ∈ P and σ ∈ SEQ be for P . By Lemma (52) it suffices to show that for some ∀ formula ϕ:
If P = P n for some n > 0 then ϕ = ( 0<m<n (m = 0)) ∧ (n = 0) satisfies (59). Suppose that P = P 0 . We can choose 0 < m < n such that range(σ) ∪ {p = q | 0 ≤ p < q < n} ∪ {n = m} is consistent. Moreover, by a simple induction on terms of the form p,
Let us now show that the "if defined" qualification in Proposition (51) cannot be eliminated. Indeed, the following result shows that discrete enumerative induction cannot always be made to work no matter what formulas are involved. So, unlike its segmental counterpart, discrete enumerative induction is not a universal method of inquiry within the first-order paradigm.
(60) Proposition: Suppose that Sym consists of a denumerable set of constants. Then there exists a solvable problem whose discrete L form -type is undefined.
Proof: Let {n | n ∈ N } enumerate the constants of Sym. Set P 0 = MOD({n = 0 | n ∈ N }). Let P 1 be the class of all structures that do not belong to P 0 . We show that P = {P 0 , P 1 } satisfies the claim of the proposition. Obviously, P is solvable. It remains to prove that for no well We summarize the relation between discrete and segmental enumerative induction using universal formulas by the following consequence of Propositions (32), (44) and (51): (61) Corollary: Let solvable problem P be given. The segmental ∀-type of P is ω at most.
If defined, the discrete ∀-type of P is ω at most, and equal to its segmental ∀-type.
Proposition (60) provides an example of a solvable problem whose discrete L form -type is undefined, hence not finite. The following proposition shows that there is, in fact, a rich collection of solvable problems with nonfinite L form -types.
(62) Proposition: Let solvable problem P be such that every σ ∈ SEQ for P is for at least two members of P. Then the discrete L form -type of P is not finite.
Proof: Suppose for a contradiction that there is n ∈ N and enumeration E = {ϕ 0 . . . ϕ n } of formulas such that ∆[P, E] solves P. We will build by induction on i a sequence {σ i | i ∈ N } of members of SEQ that are for P, a sequence {P i | i ∈ N } of members of P, and a total function f : N → {0 . . . n} such that for all i ∈ N :
Before we build those items, we show how to derive a contradiction from (63), thus completing the proof. Let i 0 ∈ N be such that range(f ) ⊆ {f (0) . . . f (i 0 )}. Then:
Proof of (64): Let i 0 ≤ i 1 ≤ i 2 be given, and suppose for a contradiction that f (i 2 ) < f (i 1 ). By (63)a applied twice, since
is satisfiable in S} ⊆ P for some P ∈ P, and f (j) = f (i 2 ). Hence σ i 2 ∧ϕ f (i 2 ) is satisfiable and
is satisfiable in S} ⊆ P for some P ∈ P.
But (63)a applied to i = i 1 implies that f (i 1 ) is the least m ≤ n such that ∅ = {S ∈ P | σ i 1 ∧ ϕ m is satisfiable in S} ⊆ P for some P ∈ P. This contradicts (65) together with the hypothesis that f (i 2 ) < f (i 1 ).
Now we use (64) to obtain the desired contradiction. Since all members of P are pairwise disjoint, we infer from (63)
which contradicts (64).
So to finish the proof we build {σ i | i ∈ N }, {P i | i ∈ N } and f : N → {0 . . . n} satisfying (63). Let P be any member of P. Fix an environment e for P . Since ∆[P, E] solves P, there exists k > 0 such that m ≤ n is least with ∅ = {S ∈ P | e[k] ∧ ϕ m is satisfiable in S} ⊆ P for some P ∈ P, and ∅ = {S ∈ P | e[k] ∧ ϕ m is satisfiable in S} ⊆ P . Set σ 0 = e[k], P 0 = P , and f (0) = m. Note that σ 0 is for P. Let i ∈ N be given, and suppose that σ 0 . . . σ i , P 0 . . . P i and f (0) . . . f (i) have been defined, and that σ i is for P. By hypothesis there exists P ∈ P such that P = P f (i) and σ i is for P . Let environment e for P extend σ i . Since ∆[P, E] solves P, there exists k ≥ length(σ i ) such that m ≤ n is least with ∅ = {S ∈ P | e[k] ∧ ϕ m is satisfiable in S} ⊆ P for some P ∈ P, and ∅ = {S ∈ P | e[k] ∧ ϕ m is satisfiable in S} ⊆ P . Set σ i+1 = e[k], P i+1 = P , and f (i + 1) = m. Plainly this construction satisfies (63).
To appreciate the import of Proposition (62), consider again the problem P defined in our running Example (2). It is easy to verify that P satisfies the conditions of the proposition. Hence, P does not have finite discrete L form -type. From Proposition (42) it follows that P does not have finite segmental L form -type either. On the other hand, Example (17) shows P to have discrete and segmental ∀-types bounded by ω. The upshot is that P can be solved via enumerative induction of both the discrete and segmental kind, but infinitely many formulas are required for this purpose. The following proposition summarizes the situation.
(66) Proposition: Let P be as in Example (2). Then the discrete and segmental ∀-types of P are both ω. The same is true of their L form -types.
Existential, ∀∃-, and ∃∀-types
Once again, let P be as in Example (2). Although P can be solved by enumerative induction, infinitely many formulas are required for this purpose. In particular, Proposition (66) shows that no reduction in number is achieved by increasing the quantifier complexity of the enumerated formulas. This raises the general question: is the discrete, universal type of a problem the lowest possible, and similarly for segmental types? In the present section we provide a negative answer by exhibiting problems whose universal types are either undefined or greater than their ∀∃-and ∃∀-types.
As a preliminary, let us ask whether simply switching from universal to existential formulas can lower the type of a problem. In the discrete case the answer is No, as revealed by the following proposition.
(67) Proposition: For all solvable problems P, if the discrete ∃-type of P is defined then the discrete ∀-type of P is 1 at most.
Proof: Let nonempty, solvable problem P be given (if P = ∅ then the ∀-type of P is 0). Suppose that the discrete ∃-type of P is defined. Let well ordering O of set X of ∃ formulas be such that ∆[P, O] solves P. Let P ∈ P and environment e for P be given.
Hence ∆[P, {x = x}] solves P, and the discrete ∀-type of P is equal to 1.
In contrast to the debility of existential formulas, we now give a sense in which the ascent to ∀∃ formulas allows maximal improvement in type. By Corollary (61), the worst universal types are ω in the segmental case, and undefined in the discrete case. Except in trivial cases, the best discrete and segmental ∀∃-types are 2. The following proposition shows there to be problems that simultaneously have the worst ∀-types and the best ∀∃-types.
(68) Proposition: Suppose that Sym consists of a denumerable set of constants and a binary predicate. Then there is a solvable problem such that:
(a) the discrete ∀-type of P is undefined;
(b) the segmental ∀-type of P is infinite;
(c) the discrete and segmental ∀∃-types of P are 2.
Proof: Let {n | n ∈ N } enumerate the constants of Sym, and let R be its binary predicate. Let P 0 consist of all members of MOD({n = 0 | n ∈ N }) in which the interpretation of R is a strict total order without greatest point. Let P 1 consist of all finite members of n>0 MOD(n = 0) in which the interpretation of R is a strict total order. Then P = {P 0 , P 1 } is a solvable problem. We show that P satisfies the claim of the proposition, starting with (a). Let satisfiable ∀ formula ϕ be such that ϕ |= ∃x(x = 0). Let X be the set of all n > 0 such that n does not appear in ϕ. Denote by n 0 the least member of X. By the choice of ϕ, {ϕ, n 0 = 0} is consistent. Hence W = {ϕ, n 0 = 0} ∪ {n = n 0 | n ∈ X} is consistent. Choose structure S and full assigment h to S with S |= W [h]. Let A ⊆ | S | be the union of {h(x) | x ∈ Var(ϕ)} with the set of interpretations of the constants n, n ∈ N . Let T be the restriction of S to A. Since ∀ formulas are preserved in substructures, W is satisfiable in T . Note that | T | is finite, and T |= (n 0 = 0). Hence T ∈ P 1 . So we have shown the following:
(69) Every satisfiable ∀ formula that implies ∃x(x = 0) is satisfiable in some member of P 1 .
Now let e be an environment for a structure S in P 0 that satisfies S |= ∃x( Compared to ∀∃, the ascent to ∃∀ formulas does not yield quite the same improvement over universal formulas. The reason is that a problem's discrete ∀-type is defined whenever its ∃∀-type is defined. There can thus be no strict analogy to Proposition (68) with ∃∀ replacing ∀∃.
(70) Proposition: For all solvable problems P, the discrete ∃∀-type of P is defined iff the discrete ∀-type of P is defined.
Proof: Let solvable problem P be given. Trivially, if the discrete ∀-type of P is defined then the discrete ∃∀-type of P is defined. Suppose that the discrete ∃∀-type of P is defined. Let set X of ∃∀ formulas and well ordering O of X be such that ∆[P, O] solves P. Let P ∈ P and σ ∈ SEQ for P be given. By Proposition (52) it suffices to exhibit a ∀ formula ϕ such that:
(71) ∅ = {S ∈ P | σ ∧ ϕ is satisfiable in S} ⊆ P .
Fix an environment e for P extending σ. In view of the last result and Corollary (61), what is the most drastic improvement to be hoped for by using ∃∀ formulas instead of universal ones? There might turn out to be a problem whose discrete and segmental ∀-types are infinite but whose respective ∃∀-types are 2. The following proposition reveals the existence of just such a problem.
(72) Proposition: Suppose that Sym consists of a binary predicate, a unary function symbol, and a constant. Then there exists a solvable problem P such that:
(a) the discrete and segmental ∀-types of P are infinite;
(b) the discrete and segmental ∀∃-types of P are 2;
(c) the discrete and segmental ∃∀-types of P are 2.
Proof: Let R be the binary predicate, s the function symbol, and 0 the constant of Sym. For n ∈ N , let n be the result of n applications of s to 0. Set: T = {(n = 0) → (∃x∀yRxy ∧ ∀x∃yRxy) | n > 0}.
Set:
For all n > 0 set:
Clearly, for all i ∈ N , P i = ∅ and for all distinct i, j ∈ N , P i ∩ P j = ∅, hence P = {P 0 , P 1 . . .} is an infinite problem. It is equally immediate that P is solvable. We prove that P satisfies the claim of the proposition, starting with (a). Since {n = 0 | n > 0} |= T , it is easy to see that P = MOD(T ). Hence, by Lemma (22) and Propositions (29) and (61), it suffices to show that the discrete ∀-type of P is defined. Let P ∈ P and σ ∈ SEQ be for P . By Lemma (52) it suffices to show that for some ∀ formula ϕ:
There nonetheless remain potentially interesting questions about enumerative induction. For one thing, we would like to have a revealing characterization of the class of problems with discrete L form -types. By Corollary (27), this class includes all solvable problems of form (T , {θ 0 . . . θ n }). By Lemma (21) and Proposition (28), there are yet other members, but we have no independent description of them. A second question concerns the complexity of problems that do have discrete L form -types. By Proposition (51), the complexity of problems with discrete ∀-types is bounded by ω. Is it similarly the case that every problem with discrete L form -type has L form -type no greater than ω?
On the more speculative side, our results are consistent with the existence of a subset X of L form yielding a rich and interesting class of segmental X-types that embraces all solvable problems. If the set X were natural or had other interesting properties, it would provide a potentially useful measure of problem complexity. In view of Corollary (61), X could not include all ∀ formulas. But aside from this constraint it is presently unclear what its composition might be.
Perhaps something akin to induction by enumeration may yet prove useful for classifying problem complexity. At present, however, a key idea appears to be missing.
